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Abstract
The uses and management o f  renewable natural resources (RNRs), and their consequences 
fo r  sustainability, are mediated in intended and unintended ways by institutional 
arrangements. This paper highlights some pitfalls in the existing literature on poverty- 
environment linkages in developing countries, and offers an alternative analytical approach 
based on the notion o f  'environmental entitlements'. This more socially articulated approach 
examines the determinants o f  effective legitimate command over RNRs, including the rules 
and institutions that control access, according to the distinctive positions o f  particular 
groups o f  people. The approach is illustrated with reference to the case o f  pastoral 
ecosystems under economic transition in Mongolia, and specifically to the community-based 
management o f  common grazing land. Three key themes are drawn out, which are o f  
relevance fo r  the management o f  RNRs in other developing economies undergoing structural 
reform: (a) the problem  o f  'institutional scarcity’ in the face o f  new transaction costs; (b) 
the distinction between the roles o f  governance and government in RNR management; and 
(c) the importance o f locally evolved, community-based institutions in managing 
environments at disequilibrium.
K ey w ords : —  entitlem ents analysis —  institutions —  environm ent and poverty —  marginal 
environm ents —  political eco logy  —  non-equilibrium eco logy  —  governance —  transitional econom ies 
—  collective  action —  transaction costs
Introduction
Sustainable development theory is rather weak on the institutional dimensions of 
natural resource management. The 'theory' attempts to span a wide ideological and 
philosophical gulf between preservationist or 'ecocentric' and managerialist or 
'technocentric' positions with regard to the relations between society and environment 
(Pepper 1984; O 'R iordan 1988; Redclift and Benton 1994). However, much 
environment-and-development literature continues to be more or less fixated with 
population increase and natural-resource degradation and scarcity. Very little of it 
adequately conveys the extent to which the uses of renewable natural resources 
(RNRs), and their consequences for sustainability, are mediated in intended and 
unintended ways by institutional arrangements. This is not to deny that there are 
serious and growing problems of natural-resource depletion and degradation in many 
parts of the developing world. But in search of pragmatic solutions to such problems,
attention should he shifted away from natural resources themselves and towards the 
humanly devised institutions that - for better or for worse - surround their 
management.
This argument applies nowhere more powerfully than in the so-called 'resource-poor' 
or 'm arginal' regions, in which many of the w orld's poorest people live. In such areas 
it is all too often assumed that the principal problem is low biophysical yields, and 
that the depletion or degradation of RNRs is an inevitable consequence of their use. In 
a much more direct way than richer or urban groups, the rural poor derive their 
livelihoods in large part from legally or socially constituted claims on natural 
resources, or from the application of their labour in activities that directly or 
indirectly affect the environment. It is unlikely that there will be a second 'green 
revolution' appropriate to marginal areas characterised by complexity and diversity of 
landscapes and livelihoods (Chambers et al. 1989). The 'new ' agenda on poverty 
reduction as espoused by the World Bank and other leading development agencies is 
remarkably silent on 'resource-poor areas', and speaks primarily of facilitating 
migration out of such regions (IBRD 1990). But given their continuing importance in 
the livelihoods of millions of people, resource-poor areas merit much more serious 
attention from development policy-makers. This demands new approaches to poverty - 
environment linkages, both analytically and with respect to policy.
Rather than viewing natural-resource availability and biophysical yields as the limiting 
factors to rural development in marginal areas, it is often more appropriate, and more 
positive, to regard 'institutions' as being the true scarce resource (Bromley 1989; 
McNicoll and Cain 1990; Ostrom 1992; de Janvry et al. 1993; Mearns 1995). Even 
with an identical mix of available physical factors, a change in the configuration of 
institutions 1 can make all the difference in net social product as well as the 
distribution of benefits among different resource users, including different social 
groups within the same household or community. Equally, institutional arrangements 
have an important influence on RNR management and sustainability. Evidence is 
mounting of the frequently superior capacity of indigenous, community-based 
institutions to manage complex, resource-poor environments, and gains support from 
ecological theory. New understanding of ecological dynamics and patchiness in 
pastoral environments at disequilibrium, for example, shows the importance of local 
institutional arrangements which have developed around and are well-adapted to 
dynamic ecology (Behnke et al. 1993; Scoones 1994; Behnke 1994).
1 Institutions are understood here as regularised patterns o f  behaviour between individuals and groups in 
society, or "complexes o f  norms, rules and behaviors that serve a collective purpose" (de Janvry et al. 
1993: 566).
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This paper draws on new and existing bodies of ecological, social and economic 
theory that have much to offer in strengthening the analysis of environment-society 
interactions. Interdisciplinary research in the social sciences (especially anthropology, 
political science and economics), history and ecology, shows how macro and micro 
constraints and potentials combine to shape the ways different groups of people gain 
access to and control over resources, and in doing so manipulate their local 
environments in ways that may in turn alter those constraints and potentials (Leach 
and Mearns 1991). This perspective draws on and is influenced by various intellectual 
traditions, including the 'entitlements' approach of Amartya Sen, extended to 
encompass the question of effective legitimate command over RNRs; other approaches 
in the 'new ' institutional economics; new thinking on ecology at disequilibrium; and 
political ecology (Watts 1983; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Little and Horowitz 
1987; Bryant 1992; Thrupp 1993).
Processes of national-level policy reform directly or indirectly affect local institutional 
arrangements surrounding the management of RNRs. They therefore have profound 
social and environmental implications. Foremost among these in the present context 
are the post-socialist economic and political transitions currently being experienced in 
developing economies throughout Inner Asia as well as Eastern and Central Europe 
(Solimano 1993). In an analytical sense, these share much in common with the 
'structural adjustment' reform packages implemented in other regions of the world 
such as Africa, Latin America and South Asia. It is characteristic o f all such reform 
packages that they aim to roll back the frontiers of the State, and variously increase 
the role of market mechanisms of economic coordination, rather than those attempted 
through central planning (Kornai 1990). The twin imperatives behind such reforms - 
combined in varying mixes from country to country - are a combination of macro- 
economic imperatives, and political demands for greater accountability in decision­
making.
If the process of economic transition appears to open up a potential window of 
opportunity at the local level, it also begs important questions about the relationship 
between government and governance. Taking 'governance' to refer to the exercise of 
legitimate authority in transacting affairs2, a working hypothesis is that good 
governance in the area of RNR management turns on the relationship between 
indigenous institutions, social norms, etc., and structures of formal government.
2 A uthor's ow n definition. For other definitions, none entirely satisfactory for our purposes, see 
Brautigam (1991).
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Government may support good governance in environmental management, or it may 
undermine it, depending on the precise configuration o f formal and informal 
institutions.
The paper is organised in the following way. First, some pitfalls in the existing 
literature on poverty-environment linkages are highlighted, and an alternative 
analytical approach is offered. Drawing on the intellectual traditions outlined above, 
this alternative approach elaborates the notion of 'environmental entitlements' (Leach 
and Mearns 1991), and will serve to situate the subsequent case study material in a 
broader context. Second, reference is made to the case of pastoral ecosystems in post­
socialist Mongolia, and specifically to the community-based management of common 
grazing land in the context of economic policy reforms. Finally, three key themes are 
drawn out of this experience that seem to be relevant for other developing economies 
undergoing structural transition: (a) transaction costs and 'institutional scarcity' in the 
transition process; (b) the distinction between the roles o f government and governance 
in RNR management; and (c) the challenge to orthodox policy approaches that 
confronts development practitioners operating in environments at disequilibrium.
Poverty-environment linkages^
Some studies of poverty-environment interactions assert that poverty and 
environmental change are linked directly. Either poverty causes environmental 
degradation, and /or environmental degradation causes poverty. This implies or 
assumes that: (a) people's livelihoods are based more or less exclusively on the use 
and management of environmental resources; (b) poverty and environmental change 
have a direct causal relationship, and can feed each other in a process o f cumulative 
causation; and (c) poverty is the principal or only cause of environmental change, and 
environmental change is the principal or only cause of poverty.
This approach commonly assumes poverty to have a negative impact on the 
environment. That is, poor people are forced to over-exploit natural resources to meet 
short-term needs regardless of the long-term consequences for their environment, 
being driven, for example, to overgraze pastures, to cut wood for sale as charcoal, or 
to cultivate and degrade marginal land. A declining resource base directly contributes 
to further poverty, and so the process continues in a 'downward spiral' (Durning 
1989) or vicious circle. Perhaps the best known among such studies are those drawing 
empirical evidence from the Himalaya region. Indeed, so numerous are such studies
3 The fo llow ing three sections draw heavily on Leach and Mearns (1991).
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and so apparently coherent the internal logic of the model4 , that it has acquired the 
status of a 'theory' in its own right: the Theory of Himalayan Environmental 
Degradation or THED (Ives and Messerli 1989).
But while some case studies appear to fit this pattern, it is neither self-evident nor 
well-researched. It is contradicted by studies in which causality appears to run the 
other way. Careful analysis of some the central assumptions, and examination of the 
contradictions in the empirical data underlying the THED, have revealed fundamental 
flaws which, while they do not totally undermine all these causal linkages, certainly 
call into question the scale on which these processes are presumed to operate, and 
more importantly point the finger of blame away from the rural peasant (Thompson et 
al. 1986; Gill 1993).
Other studies also question the assumption that population growth necessarily 
contributes to environmental degradation. For example, analysis of historical data for 
Machakos district of Kenya over the last 50 years or so has shown that technical 
innovation-led agricultural output and environmental quality (measured on a range of 
indicators) have more than kept pace with rapid population increase (Tiffen et al. 
1993). This suggests that under certain circumstances, more people may mean more 
and better environmental management, bearing out Boserup's theory of population-led 
agricultural innovation (Boserup 1965). On closer inspection however, such cases 
rarely point to population alone as the prime causal factor, but rather to various 
institutional forms that permit creative indigenous management responses in the face 
of necessity.
Poor people often do manage their environments in sophisticated and sustainable 
ways, and show themselves able to take the long view, even where conventional 
economic analysis would suggest that they must be forced to discount the future very 
heavily. Chambers points to cases in which poor farmers have been observed making 
sequential physical investments of labour in constructing silt-traps in their fields so as 
to conserve soil and moisture and progressively build up more productive terraces, an 
endeavour which yields benefits only in the long run (Chambers 1990). This is 
analogous to insights from famine theory that suggest that individual rationality is 
bound up with group survival. Both de Waal for Sudan and Harrell-Bond for Uganda 
have shown that people under conditions of famine may choose to sacrifice present
4 The logic o f  the TH ED  model can be summarised as fo llow s, where '=>' im plies causality: population 
explosion  => rising demand for fuelw ood => deforestation => expansion o f  cultivated area onto marginal 
land => increased soil erosion => increase in flooding and siltation in Ganges/Brahmaputra delta.
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consumption in order to facilitate investment in and maintenance of social networks 
likely to be crucial during the post-drought recovery phase (de Waal 1989).
The environmental entitlements approach
The main difficulty with 'vicious circles' approaches to poverty-environment linkages 
is that environmental problems are commonly seen only in terms of physical 
availability or scarcity of environmental resources in relation to the total population*'. 
Net deforestation, for example, represents a decline in the availability of forest 
resources for all groups of people, while its consequences may be especially serious 
for those poorer people who depend disproportionately on forest resources for their 
livelihoods.
But it is entirely possible for there to be 'environmental problems' for particular 
groups of people even in the face of relative abundance of natural resources. The 
central issue then is one of secure access to and control over those natural resources 
that are available. Here the concept of entitlements is useful (Sen 1981), developed 
from a particular view of political morality attributable to Rawls (1972) and in 
opposition to that of Nozick (1974). The entitlements approach entails "analysis of 
effective legitimate command [over food, RNRs], and its various channels and 
determinants, including attention to the rules and institutions that control access, and 
to the distinctive positions and vulnerabilities of different groups" (Gasper 1993:
690).
In explaining hunger and famines, Sen focuses especially on (the failure of) 
entitlements to food acquired by production and trade activities, usually through the 
market mechanism (Sen 1981; Dreze and Sen 1989). The argument rests heavily on 
notions o f individual private property, backed up by statutory law, and is primarily 
concerned with entitlements to material goods (principally food). Others have 
regarded this as too restrictive a focus, on the grounds that entitlements to food can 
also be secured through claims on and investment in a wide range of social institutions 
and networks within the 'moral economy' and backed up by systems of customary law 
(Scott 1976; Swift 1989). While they are important in the analysis of food security, 
the role of such collective or socially-grounded claims is even more significant in 
understanding the environmental entitlements of poor people, for example in relation 
to common property resources.
5 In the context o f  environmental resources, 'availability' refers to both quantity and quality o f  
resources.
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Care needs to be taken with the application of an entitlements approach in 
understanding effective legitimate command over RNRs. Although in his analysis of 
food entitlements, Sen claims he does not use the concept of 'entitlement' 
normatively, he has come in for criticism on these grounds. The very word in the 
English language conveys the meaning of a morally sanctioned 'righ t'. When 
referring to command over environmental resources, one needs to be perhaps even 
more precise in the use of the term. One of the most helpful statements of Sen's 
position is when he introduces the notion of 'capabilities' (Sen 1984, chapter 13). Sen 
regards the process of development as the expansion of people's entitlements and their 
capabilities enjoyed by the use of these entitlements. Whereas for Sen, a person's 
entitlement focuses attention on the (material) good in question, introducing the notion 
of capability focuses attention on features of people or groups in relation to goods. 
What is important is not valuing the environment per se (addressing the characteristics 
of environmental goods), but of valuing particular institutional arrangements or rules 
sets that enable the person or group of people in question to avail themselves of the 
desired characteristics of that good.
What is permissible is to view the right to a livelihood - the basic human right - in 
normative terms. It is then a secondary question how that livelihood is secured. A 
basic premise of much of the literature on poverty-environment linkages is that the 
rural poor in developing countries happen to derive a disproportionate share of their 
livelihood from their environments. In a similar vein, the urban poor happen to be 
more frequently prevented from earning a livelihood as a result of their unhealthy 
environments than the urban rich. Insofar as alternative livelihood sources are 
lacking, entitlements to use environmental resources (material and energy inputs, 
clean water etc) will remain more important to poorer than to richer people. The 
relative importance of such environmentally derived entitlements in meeting 
livelihood needs for particular groups can, in principle, be mapped out empirically. 
This is not to imply in some normative sense that they should  derive a livelihood 
directly from the environment. Indeed, very often the most appropriate forms of 
policy intervention are those which widen the range of options open to poorer people 
so as to reduce their net dependence on the environment (Lipton 1991).
Unlike food entitlements, the concept of environmental entitlements encompasses 
'ability to make effective use o f  as well as simply 'access to' (environmental) 
resources. This difference is important since it emphasises the management of 
environmental resources in securing a livelihood. The focus on management, in turn, 
shifts attention towards the conditions that both enable and constrain the ways people
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manage and use their local environment. Again, these conditions refer to prevailing 
rules sets or configurations of institutions.
'Environmental entitlements', then, can be defined as "the combined outcome o f both 
(a) the environmental resource bundles that people have command over as a result of 
their ownership, their own production, or their membership of a particular social or 
economic group; and (b) their ability to make effective use of those resource bundles" 
(Leach and Mearns 1991: 10). They therefore mediate the effects of 'poverty ' on the 
use and management of environmental resources, and in turn mediate the ways 
environmental degradation contributes to processes of impoverishment.
To take a simple example, consider herding contracts. These are an institutional 
arrangement that affects the nature of animal management (Toulmin 1992). The only 
source of income for a herder who does not own the animals in her care may be milk, 
so that she will tend to milk them harder than would owner-herders. Animal owners 
desire control over their animals, and may therefore restrict opportunities for non 
owner-herders to practice long-distance transhumance. In both instances, herding 
practices may be expected to be relatively less environmentally benign than in cases 
where owners herd their own animals.
Similarly, the reasons why farmers may move into herding and herders into farming 
frequently vary by wealth category. Richer farmers tend to move into livestock 
ownership, and richer herders into cropping, as a form of investment, while poorer 
farmers and herders tend to switch or diversify livelihood source out o f necessity or 
risk aversion. In either case, these underlying reasons also affect management 
practices. The rich are more likely to hire additional labour so as to minimise 
competition for labour between cropping and herding, whereas the labour-constrained 
poor are likely to face trade-offs between their agricultural and their livestock 
activities.
A wide range of factors, then, may influence the environmental entitlements of 
particular groups of people, whether by affecting access to environmental resources, 
or by affecting people's ability to make effective use of them. Some of the most 
important factors include natural-resource tenure arrangements, labour access and 
arrangements, claims on and investments in social institutions and networks, capital 
endowments, and technology, skills and knowledge. The role of economic incentives, 
transmitted through the price mechanism to influence the decisions individuals and 
enterprises make about natural resource management, is too often emphasized in the
literature to the exclusion of other factors structuring environmental entitlements, but 
is nonetheless of major importance and bridges the gap between the macro and the 
micro levels. These sets of factors are dynamically interrelated; processes of 
environmental change and of impoverishment can lead to changes both within each set 
and in the ways they interact.
A further consideration is the question of changes in environmental entitlements over 
time. Although they are outcomes of various structuring processes, environmental 
entitlements themselves are dynamic, and may improve or decline ( 'fa il'). Entitlement 
failure either worsens poverty, or contributes to environmental degradation because 
people are no longer able to manage environmental resources effectively. However, it 
is possible that poor people could lose as a result of availability decline with no 
change, or even alongside an improvement, in the distribution of environmental 
entitlements. The central issue here is one of sustainability, or ensuring both 
environmental availability and environmental entitlements for present and future 
generations. Poor people's environmental entitlements, or the availability of 
environmental 'quality' for them, could improve in the short run at the expense of the 
long run, not least in the context of population growth.
Poor people usually earn a livelihood by means of a diverse range of activities. 
Environmental entitlements are just one among several sources of livelihood for poor 
people. Normally the most important among others is the sale of labour. Nevertheless 
it is commonly observed that environmental entitlements are especially important in 
the livelihoods of the poor, largely because of a lack of alternative choices. The 
income/ livelihood sources of poor people also tend to be variable as well as diverse. 
Vulnerability is a measure of this variability in the face of more or less continuous 
stresses, or contingencies and other sudden shocks (eg. drought, price shocks, 
disease) and people's capacity to cope with and respond to them (Chambers et al. 
1989). It is the most critical dimension of poverty in relation to environmental 
entitlement or availability decline, because it emphasises the importance of net asset 
position in guarding against the 'ratchet' effect by which people may be driven to 
deplete or degrade environmental resources. Environmental entitlements can be 
thought of as one among several kinds of asset which can be drawn down or built up 
in strategies for dealing with shocks and stresses of various kinds.
Just as the stresses and shocks that people face in making a livelihood may or may not 
be environmental in origin, so in turn the policy responses for ensuring sustainable 
environmental management may themselves address areas apparently unrelated to
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environmental concerns. Some of the most important of these relate to contemporary 
policy approaches to poverty reduction, including employment creation and safety 
nets, including investment in human resource development such as health and 
education (IBRD 1990; Lipton et al. 1992). While aimed at poverty reduction rather 
than environmental management, these policies may have the side-effect of reducing 
the overall dependence of the poor on environmental entitlements, or reducing their 
vulnerability to environmental entitlement failure.
A simple analytical framework
The concept of 'environmental entitlements' is intended to draw attention to the 
usually indirect nature of the linkages between poverty - or wealth - and 
environmental change. It aims to supplement an assessment of relative natural- 
resource scarcity with a more socially articulated appreciation of the institutional issue 
of access to and control over resources for particular groups of people, and how these 
change over time. The overall framework is shown in diagrammatic form in figure 1.
Figure 1 The environmental entitlements framework
Source: Leach and Mearns (1991:16)
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There are two main levels of analysis in this simple framework. The first, on the left 
of the diagram, applies to particular individuals or groups of people (and their socio­
economic status) in particular environments (and their status over time). This scale 
level is usually that of the locality, eg. household, village or neighbourhood; or a 
watershed or grazing unit. It is at this level that environmental entitlements influence 
the resource-management decisions that people make, with intended or unintended 
consequences for the natural-resource base that may in turn alter people's 
environmental entitlements.
The second level is that of 'structuring processes'. These lie to the right of figure 1. 
From this viewpoint many of the phenomena and interactions discussed so far prove 
to be manifestations of underlying causes operating elsewhere, at scales from the local 
up to the international or global. Many of these processes are exogenous to 'people in 
places' in the sense that people in those localities have no direct influence over them. 
They include political, social and economic factors, encompassing policies, processes, 
and the context within which they operate; environmental change, encompassing both 
natural and human-induced changes; and demographic processes, which encompass 
both 'in  situ' population change and migration. These structuring processes are 
themselves interrelated in diverse and complex ways. As the two-way arrows show in 
figure 1, they interact with the dynamics of processes at the level of 'people in places' 
so that, in effect, the 'system ' never settles.
Contemporary post-socialist transitions are an example of the kind of macro-level 
shock wrought by far-reaching changes in economic and political institutions. This 
may translate into a substantial change in the rules of the game for local resource 
managers, by altering their environmental entitlements, and in turn possibly altering 
the manner in which they manage natural resources. At the same time, the cumulative 
effect of local responses may reflexively alter the course of the macro reform process.
The case o f Mongolia
The process of M ongolia's post-socialist transition proper began in early 1990. 
Although economic reforms inspired by Soviet perestroika had been under way since 
1986 (Milne et al. 1991; Collins and Nixson 1993), it was not until the pro­
democracy movement of early 1990 that the building of a market economy began in 
earnest. Mongolia is a land-locked country with a population of a little over two 
million people, half of whom live in rural areas and depend to a large extent on 
livestock for their livelihoods. Among transitional economies of Inner Asia, Mongolia 
is unique in that it was formally independent of the USSR during its 70 years of
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socialism and has therefore been able to liberalise more rapidly than its neighbours in 
former Soviet Central Asia. It is also distinguished from the autonomous regions of 
Inner Asia under Chinese control in that political reform has also accompanied 
economic reforms in Mongolia.
Mongolia has privatised very quickly indeed by the standards of other transitional 
economies in Eastern Europe: "by the end of 1992, more than 80% of the industrial, 
service, trade and agricultural sectors had been privatised, judged by both the number 
of enterprises and the amount of capital stock" (Korsun and Murrell 1994, p2). The 
phrase economic 'transition' implies a greater degree of continuity in formal economic 
institutions than is in fact the case. During the early years of reform Mongolia 
experienced a shock so severe that it threatened economic collapse, and the process 
remains far from smooth (Murrell et al. 1992). A conservative estimate of the overall 
impact of this shock put the expected decline in real national income between 1990 
and 1992 in the order of 30-35 per cent (MPR 1991a; Lee 1993).
Agriculture remains the most important sector of the economy, accounting directly for 
some 20% of national income and 30% of national employment, and indirectly for a 
further significant share of national income and employment in agricultural product 
processing and marketing. Agricultural products also make up around a quarter o f all 
exports and foreign exchange earnings. Perhaps even more important in the straitened 
circumstances following the cessation of CMEA credits and imports of cheap food, 
fuel and spare parts from the former USSR, is the contribution of domestic agriculture 
to food supply. By far the most important sub-sector within agriculture is pastoral 
livestock husbandry, which accounts for around 75% of gross output in agriculture. 
This figure is likely to be increasing given the difficulties faced by the former state 
farms, designed to produce wheat and liquid milk for urban consumers during the 
winter using petroleum-intensive technology which has become virtually moribund. 
Owing to low producer prices, rapid inflation, and severe transport constraints, much 
of the output of livestock and livestock products is untraded (Edstrom 1993). The 
pastoral collectives, having existed since the 1950s, have virtually all been 
transformed into limited and joint-stock companies and cooperatives.
Figure 2 attempts to flesh out the bare bones of the environmental entitlements 
framework elaborated earlier. Several examples are offered to show how the process 
of economic transition in Mongolia translates into changes in the environmental 
entitlements of particular herding households and their individual members. Only a 
few of the factors that influence these entitlements are considered here, namely:
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natural-resource tenure arrangements that affect access to grazing and water; access to 
labour for herd management; and the related issues of kinship networks and the re- 
emergence of the customary khot ail, or camp of several cooperating herding 
households. Each of these has implications for the ways in which animals and natural 
resources - especially pasture - are managed, which in turn affects local processes of 
environmental change.
The most important aspect of environmental change that is 'exogenous' to herding 
households in particular places for present purposes is the question whether or not in 
Mongolia there is a downward trend in the availability and/or quality of forage from 
natural pastures. Many Mongolian as well as outside observers perceive that there is 
such a trend, and that it is directly related to the number or density of grazing 
animals, or overgrazing. For example, the Asian Development Bank is planning a 
livestock feed resources management project which has as a primary justification the 
belief, based partly on data gathered by the Mongolian Institute of Botany, that a very 
high proportion of pasture land is already degraded or at serious risk of degradation 
from overstocking.
Mongolian herders themselves see things differently. They distinguish between 
pasture that is 'eaten' and pasture that is degraded (Fernandez-Gimenez 1993).
'Eaten' areas are caused by a temporary concentration of people and animals in one 
place, but usually regrow during the subsequent growing season without permanent 
change in species composition or productivity. Where seasonal pasture deferral is 
practised, as is common in many parts of the country (Bazargiir et al. 1992; Mearns 
1993a, 1993c), many pastures are likely to be grazed out in this way at the end of a 
season. Degraded areas, on the other hand, are permanently altered in species 
composition and productivity and are characterised by soil loss and sandiness; herders 
more usually attribute such degradation to overland vehicular traffic and compaction 
by agricultural machinery since, they argue, animals do not damage plant root 
systems by grazing. The Mongolian Government's National Report prepared for 
UNCED shares this assessment (MPR 1991b).
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The availability of forage resources is certainly an important limiting factor in 
livestock production in pastoral environments as dry as those in Mongolia and other 
parts of Inner Asia, and in which by far the greater part of animal nutrition 
requirements is met from natural pasture. In fact, variation in forage resource 
availability and predictability from one ecological zone to another can be shown to 
explain a good deal of the regional variation in patterns of territoriality among 
Mongolian pastoralists and the informal arrangements that they have evolved to 
coordinate access to common grazing land and key point resources (eg. wells)
(Mearns 1993c). In areas of relatively low forage density and predictability - such as 
the desert steppes in southeastern Mongolia with annual precipitation totals of around 
125mm and a coefficient of variation (CV) in precipitation of 52% - pastoral land 
tenure is characterised by an opportunistic grazing strategy. A high degree of mobility 
and flexibility of movement permits access to localised patches of forage that vary in 
quantity and quality from place to place and from time to time. By contrast, in areas 
of relatively higher forage density and predictability - the 'typical' steppe zone 
towards the North, for example, with an annual precipitation of around 300mm and a 
CV of 30% - a much more geographically stable territorial system operates.
Although relative natural-resource availability and variability explain a good deal of 
the variation in territorial behaviour among pastoralists in different ecological zones, 
a full understanding of pastoral land tenure arrangements and their change or 
continuity over time also requires that the influence of changing political and 
economic conditions and public policies be taken into account (Mearns 1993c). The 
period of collectivised production in Mongolia saw a surprising degree of continuity 
in land tenure arrangements in particular localities. Public policies during the period 
often tacitly underwrote customary practice, such as the norms and customs that 
surrounded the allocation of particular winter shelters. There were also significant 
changes however. A range of public policy-related factors, while they led to a general 
rise in the living standards of herders, had the effect of reducing herder mobility. 
Territorial behaviour became to some extent delinked from ecological factors, as a 
result of public action to minimise the impact of environmental stress on individual 
herders. This included investment in winter shelter construction, water supply, and 
the subsidised provision of animal feed supplements and transport.
The period of decollectivisation has seen a partial return to patterns of territorial 
behaviour more directly influenced by ecological factors and less by public policy. 
Most obvious have been the responses of individual herders to the dramatic decline in 
collective provision of transport and animal fodder, including a return to cooperative
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hay-making within neighbourhood groups, and mutual assistance with base camp 
moves using draught animals. Many of these re-emergent forms of cooperation are 
based in local kinship-based networks. This transition process has been far from 
smooth however, and is also far from complete. In the short term at least, there has 
been an increase in the incidence of abuses of local norms of coordination over 
pasture use. Some of the reasons for this appear to include the large numbers of 
newcomers to herding, and the lower opportunity costs of free-riding behaviour by 
them.
Evolved coordination norms over pasture use include seasonal pasture deferral in the 
more productive regions; and priority to customary owners of winter and spring 
shelter sites, to previous users of a pasture site where some mark or a dung pile has 
been left, or to first-comers. As with many social norms, these informal rules have 
become largely internalised in herders' everyday patterns of behaviour, so that they 
are rarely acknowledged explicitly. It is usually only when conflicts arise, requiring 
conscious arbitration, that they are shown to be in evidence. O ne's reputation among 
neighbouring herders (many of whom are relatives), and the need to cooperate with 
them in other activities such as herding, hay-making and the like, are sufficiently 
strong most of the time that herders tend to abide by local norms of pasture use 
(Mearns 1993b).
In the period of economic and political transition following decollectivisation 
however, two contradictory trends can be identified: one which threatens to 
undermine coordination norms around local pasture use, and one which could 
potentially strengthen them. The first of these trends is the atmosphere of uncertainty 
that characterises the reform process. This contrasts markedly with the rigidities and 
limited individual freedoms of centuries of hierarchical, feudal organisation, followed 
by 70 years of central planning. The feudal state prior to collectivisation interfered 
relatively little with the day-to-day business of herd management, but provided a 
stable, ordered social formation within which it could go on. Similarly, under 
collectivisation, the bounds within which herders operated were clear, known and 
predictable.
Under the present conditions of structural chaos however, the necessary degree of 
institutional stability required for the upholding of group norms regarding land tenure, 
and for the potential exercise of sanctions within local groups, is absent. This 
uncertainty makes it difficult for herders to form mutual expectations of each others' 
actions. It tends to heighten the assurance problem of not knowing to what extent
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other herders are likely to stint, or voluntarily exercise restraint, in their use of 
pasture. Other things being equal, individual herders are likely to perceive a lower 
threat o f sanctions against free-riding behaviour. That is, the opportunity cost of 
attempting to maximise individual gain from the available pasture is perceived to be 
lower. While economic and political conditions are changing rapidly, it is difficult to 
learn from past experience in order to anticipate the behaviour of others, since a 
particular conjuncture of circumstances influencing one's own and others' decisions 
may never be repeated.
In one forest/mountain steppe area of Arkhangai province, for example, an orderly 
system of seasonal pasture deferral was beginning to come under threat during 1992, 
following the dissolution of the collective and the privatisation of its herds. A large 
group of more than twenty herding households moved to their autumn camps much 
earlier than usual. Those who moved first claimed at the time that they had moved 
only to build new shelters and stockyards following privatisation, but remained for 
several months, during which time they were joined by others. The group included 
both experienced herders and newcomers who had only recently acquired animals in 
the privatisation of the local collective's herds. They had moved against the advice of 
the bag (sub-district) leader, who was told that if he wanted them to return he would 
have to provide transport; they knew he would be unable to do so, given shortages of 
fuel and vehicle spare parts. Other local herders, normally members of the same 
community group, regretted not having moved with the renegade group, since they 
had missed out on the best grazing that year from their autumn pastures. However, 
the renegade group did not expect to take such action the following year, since they 
felt they had learned from their mistake during 1992, when the autumn pastures 
became heavily congested and grazed out before the end of the season (Mearns 1993a, 
1993b).
Recent changes in the structure of the rural economy have contributed to this trend 
favouring individual free-riding behaviour. Most important among these is the 
surprising demographic factor of net urban-to-rural migration. On average, the total 
number of herding (rural) households across Mongolia increased by 25 percent during 
1992. The individual figures for areas close to the capital city, Ulaanbaatar, were 
considerably higher (PALD 1993). This includes several different types of household, 
but numerically the most important are families leaving the city for the countryside in 
response to rising urban unemployment and economic uncertainty, who acquired 
animals through the privatisation of state and collective herds. These are 'newcomers' 
to herding, or urban-to-rural migrants. Field data from the relatively remote provinces
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of Arkhangai and Dornogobi suggest that they made up about 20% of total households 
in the communities surveyed.
This counter-intuitive, and probably temporary, increase in the number of herding 
households reflects a lack of alternative sources of livelihood. Livestock herding is 
perceived not so much as a secure and productive economic opportunity in itself, 
especially given low prices and formidable marketing constraints, but it does at least 
provide some measure of household food security. Even if producer prices were to 
rise substantially, the extra incentive to livestock production would be unlikely to lead 
to a commensurate rise in the total number o f animals. A severe winter-spring feed 
constraint appears to have operated to keep the national herd below a ceiling of 
around 25 million head for several decades, in spite of efforts to increase its size by 
means of heavily subsidised fodder production and distribution under collectivisation 
(Swift 1995).
Even without an increase in total animal numbers, the increase in the number of 
herding households poses potential problems for sustainable land management within 
existing herding communities. The newcomers are usually less experienced herders, 
and less aware of the importance of local customs to coordinate use of grazing land. 
For example, they are more likely to stay at their winter pasture sites than to move to 
new pastures during the spring, autumn and summer. Newcomers also tend to move 
irregularly because they do not yet have winter shelters and established herding 
relationships within groups. They are often less integrated into rural communities, and 
are therefore less likely to take into account the benefits of cooperation with other 
herders in other ways, such as shared herding, helping to move camp, looking for lost 
animals, or making hay. Experienced herders of long standing in the community are 
more likely to cooperate with their neighbours over the use of grazing land, because 
they know that there are additional benefits to cooperation. The new herding 
households' primary loyalties are likely to remain towards the towns, rather than to 
the rural community.
In opposition to this trend favouring individual free-riding behaviour is the re- 
emergence of local customary institutions, notably the khot ail, within which herders 
engage in various forms of mutual assistance. Under collectivisation, the decline of 
such labour-pooling arrangements was a contributory factor in the decline of 
customary mechanisms for coordinating and regulating pasture use and the arbitration 
of land disputes. Conversely, their strong re-emergence in contemporary Mongolia 
can be expected to increase the incentives for collective action in the management of
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common pastures. As argued elsewhere, this second, positive trend provides a key 
opportunity to strengthen pasture land management by building on and strengthening 
local community institutions as an integral component of land policy reform (Mearns 
1993a; PALD 1993).
Lastly we should consider explicitly how the environmental entitlements of particular 
herding households and their individual members vary, even when faced with similar 
changes in macro-level 'structuring processes'. Once again, the link to environmental 
management practices and potential environmental change in these cases operates via 
the intermediate set of decisions around herd management, since livestock products 
are the principal livelihood source. Differentiation among herding households and 
their individual members takes several forms^. Different levels o f skill and experience 
in herding have already been discussed in relation to newcomers to herding.
Differentiation between household members should not be underestimated, especially 
in the case of gender, which may critically affect the capacity o f different individuals 
to respond to new economic opportunities that may arise with economic reforms. 
Women shoulder the greater part o f household reproduction tasks (childcare, cooking, 
cleaning, etc) as well as a major share in production (eg. milking and dairy product 
processing). Owing to this double-bind on their time, women are usually much less 
mobile than are men, and less likely to be in a position to take advantage of new 
opportunities offered by trading and the marketing of livestock products.
Wealth differences are significant and growing (Cooper 1993). The size o f the 
household herd is invariably the most important among the criteria identified in 
participatory wealth ranking exercises7, but other criteria consistently mentioned by 
herders are holdings of other assets (eg. gold and silver valuables and saddlery) and 
connections with influential people in the administration or 'friends in high places' 
(Mearns et al. 1992). Information on household demographic structure is implicit in 
the individual scores of households in such ranking exercises: households with a 
young age structure and high dependency ratio tend to be perceived as less well-off 
than those with more adult members. This reflects the lifecycle of a herding
6 Unlike in other parts o f Inner Asia, ethnic d ivisions are not very significant in M ongolia. Over 90% 
of the population are Khalkh Mongols, although significant pockets o f  other ethnic groups (eg.
Kazakhs) are found in the Western provinces o f  Khovd and Bayanolgii.
7 Wealth ranking (Grandin 1988) is one o f  a very large range o f  participatory research methods now in 
use for eliciting self-assessments o f w ell-being and other forms o f  situational analysis on the part o f local 
communities. For the most up-to-date survey o f  the state-of-the-art of'participatory rural appraisal' 
(PRA), see Chambers (1994a, 1994b, 1994c).
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household: it takes some years to build up a large herd and to become proficient in 
herding and animal management skills.
A 'stepped' relationship tends to operate between the household size and herd size: 
the number o f animals may increase only up to a certain point before additional 
household members are required to care for them. If animals of several species are 
considered, this relationship become more complex. There are significant economies 
of scale to be gained in cooperating with other households so as to pool the herds of 
large (cattle/yak and/or horses) and small stock (sheep and goats), and to take turns in 
taking them to pasture each day.
During the period of collectivised production (1940s-80s), collective members were 
allocated a certain number of animals of a single species by their collective, and were 
paid a salary for fulfilling their production quotas. After animals began to be 
privatised and restrictions on private herd sizes were lifted around 1991, most herding 
households returned to the customary practice of maintaining a household herd with 
animals of several different species (Mearns 1992). Two important reasons for this 
seem to have been to increase the range of livestock products that could be produced 
within the household, given the difficulties and high costs incurred in obtaining 
essential items of food and clothing from the poorly functioning state sector or the 
still fledgling system of private traders; and to spread risk. Under collectivised 
production the pastoral collectives - effectively the state - bore the brunt of risk in 
livestock production by supplying subsidised inputs in the form o f supplementary 
livestock feed during harsh winter periods, water, transport for moving camp, etc., 
and by making direct social welfare transfer payments. The transition to a market 
economy has meant that much of this risk is now being shouldered directly by 
individual herding households (Mearns 1993a; Templer et al. 1993).
In response to this increased risk burden, herding households have reponded in 
several ways, depending on their existing endowments of labour. One already alluded 
to is to increase various forms of mutual assistance with other households, notably 
through the kinship and other ties that bond the khot ail together. A second is the 
withdrawal of children (usually boys) from school owing to the increased demand for 
family labour following the start of privatisation of the collectivised herds. As table 1 
illustrates, drawing on data for a single former brigade of a collective in a desert- 
steppe area of Dornogobi province, this practice is related both to the size of 
household herds (using wealth rank as a proxy) and to household size and age 
structure (Mearns et al. 1992). Although the sample size here is small (n =  75), the
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data show a bimodal distribution. Households with absentee school children fall either 
in the 'poorer, large' quadrant (lower left), or in the 'richer, small' quadrant (upper 
right) of the matrix. The former need additional labour because they have few 
workers relative to dependents. The latter need additional labour because they have 
larger herds overall, while adult children may be attracted away from herding by 
alternative economic opportunities such as private trading. The labour constraint in 
herding has become more severe as households diversify their herds, but it takes 






o f  household  
per quartile,
size (%) 
n =  75)
0-25 26-50 51-75 76-100




class 11 0 6 4 7





IV (poorest) 0 7 5 2
Note: ©  indicates households with a child known to be permanently absent from school
Source: Mearns et al. (1991)
Table 1 Wealth, labour availability and school absenteeism
Analysis of annual household incomes in six sample districts in 1993 found that the 
average per capita incomes (net of own consumption) of the poorest households were 
around a third less than those of middle income and nearly half of those of richer 
households (Cooper 1993). This resulted in clear differences in income and 
expenditure patterns between richer and poorer households. The proportion of sales of 
livestock and livestock products was highest for the poorest households, owing to 
their need to sell products in order to purchase basic goods (eg. flour) in spite of the 
unfavourable terms of trade that confront rural producers. Wealthier households have 
the option o f withdrawing from the market until conditions are more favourable.
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Indeed, the poorest households in the sample spent the highest proportion o f their 
income on purchased foodstuffs (especially flour) and least on clothing and essential 
inputs such as prepared animal fodder and hay. Instead of the latter they relied on 
home-produced feed supplements, at some potential cost in terms of animal 
productivity.
Conclusion: three themes
This paper has argued that the uses of RNRs, and their consequences for 
sustainability, are mediated in intended and unintended ways by various forms of 
institutional arrangement. In the case of Mongolia, sustainable RNR use and 
management is seen to depend on the continuing viability of pastoral management 
systems well adapted to a harsh and variable environment, as has been documented 
throughout this century by early Soviet geographers and others (Aubin 1993). There 
are new constraints, however, such as localised population pressure, and new forms 
of market penetration, to which there need to be appropriate institutional responses. 
Existing theory around the notion of sustainable development remains inadequate in 
relation to these institutional dimensions of RNR exploitation and preservation, 
although significant progress is being made in this regard. The environmental 
entitlements framework presented here is intended as a further step in this direction.
From the Mongolia case study set out in this paper using the environmental 
entitlements framework, three salient themes emerge. These are relevant to a 
consideration of the links between environment and development in all of the post­
socialist transitional economies of Asia, as well as in considering the institutional 
dimensions of RNR use and their role in ecosystem preservation more generally.
The first theme is institutional scarcity. One of the most powerful insights from 
recent social science theory that has yet to be placed squarely on the environment and 
development agenda is from the new institutional economics: "when it is costly to 
transact, institutions matter" (North 1990, p l2 ). Transaction costs include search 
costs (identifying opportunities), bargaining costs (agreeing among the relevant parties 
to a certain course of action), and monitoring and enforcement costs. Institutions 
operate to reduce or offset transaction costs by regularising and making predictable 
transactions between individuals. All forms of property - private, common, or state - 
involve transaction costs. Clearly defined property rights, whether formal or 
customary, represent an institutional arrangement that reduces uncertainty in 
exchanging and enforcing rights to gain access to and control particular resources 
(Eggertsson 1990). Coordination norms around pasture use in M ongolia, for example,
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are such ingrained social norms for most experienced herders that the transaction 
costs incurred in deciding who gets to graze where and when are reduced to a 
minimum: the institutional arrangements operate at the level of the sub-conscious.
Owing to the extremely high transaction costs entailed in making a major economic 
and political transition at the level of an entire economy, the value of pre-existing 
institutional arrangements for ensuring that economic affairs may continue should not 
be underestimated. In M ongolia's earlier macroeconomic transition - from feudalism 
to socialism - with the advent of central planning and collectivisation, the continuity 
of certain institutional arrangements may have saved the day. For example, had the 
reform of administrative boundaries been fully complete in the 1930s, so that herders 
would have been prevented from moving across administrative boundaries even when 
these dissected their customary routes of transhumance, the consequences for 
livestock production could have been disastrous. As it was, herders continued to move 
illegally across the new district boundaries when necessary, thereby safeguarding 
production on behalf of the collectives; the state was, fortunately, unable adequately 
to police such transgressions. In a similar vein, recent research in Mongolia has 
shown that Mongolian citizens used their privatisation vouchers to invest in the 
enterprises that employ them, even when this is not in their direct economic interest. 
This includes the new rural enterprises that have replaced the herding collectives. 
These investors apparently seek to retain an environment that is 'known and 
comfortable' and that minimises disruption (Korsun and M urrell 1994).
The second, related theme is the distinction between government and governance. 
These are not at all the same thing. Governance is broadly understood to refer to the 
exercise of legitimate authority in transacting affairs. It involves the maintenance of 
social order through endogenously evolved sets of rules, or some combination of 
locally evolved and externally imposed rules sets. Government, by contrast, is one 
aspect of governance, referring specifically to the role of external authorities in 
maintaining social order. In the absence of government, either because external sets of 
rules have not so far been devised in specific contexts (such as legislation designed to 
protect the environment), or because weak administrative capacity hinders the 
enforcement of law and policy, governance - or the lack of it - becomes entirely a 
question of endogenously evolved sets of rules.
With respect to natural resources, government refers to the de jure  set of rules as set 
out in statutory law and state policy relating to natural resource ownership, tenure and 
use; and the administrative framework through which it is implemented. The broader
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concept of governance refers to the sum o f rules sets that apply de facto. It thus 
includes the customary rules that also influence who has access to and control over 
natural resources, how, and at what times; the extent and manner in which those rules 
are monitored and enforced; and the traditional or other systems of authority through 
which they may be legitimated. In some cases, the operation and manner of 
enforcement of statutory law may be in harmony with customary practices, in which 
case government supports governance. Perhaps more commonly, in cases such as the 
introduction of smaller administrative units in Mongolia during the 1930s, the de jure 
and de facto sets of rules come into conflict. Government may undermine customary 
structures of authority that contribute to the successful regulation of natural resource 
use, and in so doing hinder effective governance. It is emphasised that neither 
governance nor government, or the specific rules sets that make them up, entirely 
determine actual natural resource management practices; however, they are one of the 
most important influences over patterns of interaction between resource users.
The final theme is the question o f ecologies at disequilibrium, and brings us full 
circle to the issue of natural-resource scarcity. Earlier in this paper the question of 
forage density and predictability was raised. In practice, there is a high degree of 
observed covariance between low resource density and low resource predictability. In 
arid environments precipitation is the major limiting factor on plant growth, and is 
generally characterised by a high interannual coefficient of variation (CV). This is one 
of the cornerstones o f the recent literature on 'new' ecological thinking as applied in 
the context of range ecology and management in dryland Africa (Westoby et al. 1989; 
Behnke et al. 1993; Walker 1993; Scoones 1994). In this literature attention is drawn 
to a continuum between equilibrial and non-equilibrial systems, according to the 
degree to which the biotic components of the grazing ecosystem (net primary 
productivity of forage, wild and domestic herbivore populations) achieve stability 
such that their dynamics have a significant influence over one another by means of 
internal feedbacks. In non-equilibrial systems, which evidence suggests are those in 
which precipitation CVs exceed about 33 percent, it is unlikely that there will be 
sufficient ecosystem stability for the density of grazing animals to influence 
significantly long-run forage availability, since this is determined primarily by 
variability in the external factor o f precipitation itself.
Research in Mongolia has shown that this rule-of-thumb criterion is met for 
something in the order of half the total area of the country. Much of the rest of Inner 
Asia also constitutes dryland environments that are characterised by variability and 
non-equilibrium dynamics. The implications for pastoral development policy are
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enormous. Conventional range management practice is predicated on the idea of 
controlling the stocking rate of grazing animals so as to control the rate o f forage 
exploitation and possible deterioration. As M ongolian herders know only too well, 
however, long-run forage condition in non-equilbrium environments is affected more 
by variability in precipitation.
Indigenous pastoral resource management practices based on opportunistic grazing 
strategies, well-adapted to non-equilibrium ecological dynamics, have proven 
themselves to be productive and resilient and deserve support through appropriate 
forms of policy reform (PALD 1993). In the area o f land tenure, rather than attempt 
to clarify property rights over grazing land at the level of individual herders or 
herding camps, these should seek to build on existing, scarce institutions at 
community level, thereby capitalising on centuries o f experience embodied in social 
norms of pasture use. Any other course o f action would incur extremely hgh 
transaction costs in terms of herding livelihoods, foregone production and 
environmental damage. At the same time, such a process of reform would bring 
structures of government effectively in line with structures o f effective governance in 
the management of natural resources.
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